Despite the theoretical prediction that options improve market efficiency, this study finds that option trading does not attenuate the well-known idiosyncratic volatility anomaly, i.e., the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent stock returns. We argue that the relation between informed option trading and the magnitude of the anomaly is driven by two effects: participation by informed investors improves market efficiency (a causality effect), but their option trades are likely to occur on most inefficiently priced stocks (a selection effect). Using two proxies for informed option trading, we show that the selection effect dominates. Among stocks with high informed option trading intensity, a long-short portfolio based on idiosyncratic volatility deciles generates returns as high as 2.11% per month. By contrast, for stocks with low informed option trading intensity, idiosyncratic volatility does not predict stock returns. We also find that the private information possessed by option traders is related to forthcoming corporate earnings news.
I. Introduction
Several well-established theoretical results predict that derivatives securities help improve financial market efficiency. Derivatives such as options help complete the financial market (Ross 1976) , facilitate information aggregation across heterogeneously-informed investors (Grossman 1977) , and bring out information traders who wouldn't otherwise trade (Black 1975) . Options also enable investors to get around the short-sale constraints in the stock market, and thus increase the speed of negative information being incorporated into stock prices (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987) .
Motivated by the efficiency role of options, in this study we directly examine the effect of option trading on a well-known pattern of stock market mispricing, i.e., a market anomaly.
Contrary to the theoretical prediction, we find that the stock market anomaly is not weakened, but somewhat intensified among a group of stocks with active option trading. This surprising initial finding leads us to a more comprehensive evaluation of the informational effects of option trading.
The stock market anomaly in our spotlight is the negative relation between idiosyncratic stock return volatility and subsequent stock returns, recently documented by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006; . Such a negative volatility-return relation is intriguing because it runs contrary to the basic principle of how risk should be priced in asset prices. Option trading could alleviate this anomaly in several ways, and most prominently so due to the advantage options offer to overcome short-sale constraints. As observed by Ang et al. (2006) , the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly is mainly in the form of abnormally low returns to stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility (hereafter IVOL), while stocks with low IVOL do not exhibit abnormally high returns. Therefore, the ability to short-sell high-IVOL stocks via options could help arbitrage away this anomaly. In fact, one popular explanation of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly links it to the Miller (1977) effect; that is, in the presence of short-sale constraints, stocks with high dispersion of investor opinions (proxied by high idiosyncratic volatility) tend to be over-priced. Under this hypothesis, the IVOL anomaly should not exist in the first place if investors can use options to effectively express their negative opinions.
Our empirical analysis starts with a subsample of stocks that have actively traded options and valid option quotes at the end of a month (so that we can measure returns to both the stocks and their options; details are described later). In this subsample, stocks ranked in the lowest IVOL decile outperform stocks in the highest IVOL decile by 1.75% per month.
By comparison, in the entire stock universe, the return spread between stocks in the lowest and highest IVOL deciles is lower, at 1.23%. Notably, the higher magnitude of the IVOL anomaly in the subsample is mainly because stocks in the top IVOL decile have lower return in the subsample (-0.78%) than in the entire stock universe (-0.27%). Also intriguing is the fact that stocks in this subsample are large and liquid, and mispricing on such stocks should typically be weak even without considering the role of options.
Further, options are similarly mispriced. For the stock subsample identified above, we calculate the returns to option portfolios that mimic returns to underlying stocks based on the put-call parity (i.e., synthetic returns), and find a strong negative relation between IVOL and synthetic returns. In fact, the synthetic returns to the IVOL decile portfolios, and the resulting top-bottom spread, are quite similar to those on the underlying stock portfolios.
Thus, using options to short-sell high-IVOL stocks is feasible and generates a return similar to that of actually shorting the stocks. Yet option trading appears to have not at all corrected the mispricing of IVOL on either options or underlying stocks.
What can possibly give rise to the strong anomaly among stocks with active option trading? A prime candidate explanation we investigate is the effect of informed option trading. In an insightful article, Black (1975) conjectures that options attract informed traders due to two advantages options offer -leverage and the ability to overcome shortsale constraints. He further conjectures that more informed trading in the option market makes the stock price more informative, which we refer to as the "causality effect" of informed trading (as one of the several theoretical mechanisms through which option trading improves market efficiency). However, the causality effect critically depends on the assumption that option trading is competitive so that traders' private information is quickly impounded into security prices. If option trading is not competitive -that is, when informed investors can trade strategically to hide their private information -a different prediction emerges: the more informed option trading, the less efficient stock prices are. Counter-intuitive as it may appear at first, this outcome is essentially due to a "selection effect": among stocks with varying degrees of price efficiency, informed option trading most likely takes place on the least efficient, or most mispriced, stocks.
The relative importance of the causality effect vs. the selection effect is an interesting empirical issue that has not been the explicit focus of any prior work. Nonetheless, the idea of non-competitive option trading is not new. For example, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) provide a theoretical model where informed investors can trade strategically in both the stock and option markets. In their model, informed option trading does not instantly result in informative option prices or stock prices; rather, option trading volume moves ahead of changes in option prices and stock prices to reflect traders' private information.
To establish a more direct link between informed option trading and stock mispricing, the challenge is to find an empirical proxy for informed option trading. For this, we resort to a measure recently developed by Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyan (2010) , the relative option trading intensity O/S. O/S is the option trading volume scaled by underlying stock trading volume, which, in a salient way, captures the effect of informed investors being lured away from the stock market to the options market. More importantly, Roll et al. (2010) provide evidence that O/S during a short window prior to earnings announcements reflects private information about corporate earnings.
1 Of course, option trading can result from information as well as uninformed speculation or hedging activities. Consequently, a high O/S could reflect the attractiveness of the option market to informed investors as well as to uninformed gamblers and hedgers. Fortunately, the selection effect of informed trading combined with the nature of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly produces a sharper prediction: the relation between O/S and informed trading is stronger when mispricing is more rampant. More concretely, for high-IVOL stocks (which are likely to be mispriced),
1 Specifically, Roll et al. find that higher pre-announcement O/S leads to higher absolute value of postannouncement returns. Further, when post-announcement returns are positive, higher pre-announcement O/S is positively correlated with post-announcement returns; on the other hand, conditional on negative post-announcement returns, pre-announcement O/S is negatively related to post-announcement returns.
O/S is likely to be indicative of informed option trading; on the other hand, among low-IVOL stocks (which tend to be correctly priced), a high O/S does not necessarily mean informed trading.
The empirical evidence is consistent with the above prediction. We double-sort stocks on O/S and IVOL. Among stocks in the high O/S tercile, the return spread between the bottom and top IVOL deciles is 1.93%. By contrast, among stocks in the low O/S tercile, the spread is much smaller and insignificant, at 0.74%. Notably, the large and significant difference in return spread between the two O/S groups is primarily due to the difference in returns to the top IVOL decile (-1.22% for the top O/S tercile and 0.21% for the low O/S tercile), while the returns to the bottom IVOL decile is similar between the two O/S groups.
We also consider a variation to the informed option trading proxy, OI/S, which is the ratio of option open interest to the stock trading volume. The results based on OI/S are even stronger. The bottom-top IVOL decile return difference is 0.64% among stocks in the low OI/S tercile and 2.11% among stocks in the high OI/S tercile. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that OI/S is a conditional measure of informed option trading and that there is a dominant selection effect of informed trading.
Importantly, the effect of O/S (OI/S) on the IVOL anomaly is not driven unilaterally by either stock trading activity or option trading activity. Stocks in the high O/S (OI/S) tercile have relatively high, instead of low, stock trading turnover, suggesting that they are not illiquid stocks. We further show that the results are robust to the control of additional factors such as the size, BM, and momentum characteristics, the effect of O/S and OI/S per se on stock returns, short-term return reversal (Huang et al. 2010) , implied volatility smirk (Xing et al., 2009) , and investors' misreaction to realized volatility (Goyal and Saretto, 2009 Roll et al. (2010) and Jiang, Yao, and Xu (2009), we focus on perhaps the most important form of private information that investors may possess -soon-to-be-announced corporate earnings. Roll et al. (2010) We evaluate two alternative interpretations of the O/S effect. The first is that high O/S may represent the attractiveness of options to investors with a strong gambling preference (i.e. the skewness preference). The second is that high O/S may be the result of short-sale constrained investors switching from the stock market to the options market. Our empirical analysis does not support these alternative interpretations.
Overall, the findings of this paper suggest that informed investors trade in the options market to take advantage of their private information, consistent with Black's (1975) insight that options attract informed investors. However, contrary to Black's conjecture that more informed trading bring about more efficient stock prices, we find a dominant selection effect -the more informed option trading, the stronger is stock mispricing. This further indicates that option trading by informed investors is strategic and not fully competitive.
Our study also contributes to the active debate in the current literature on the nature of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly. Although this anomaly has become well-known, its exact cause remains a highly controversial issue. The proposed explanations include the effect of short-sale constraints and investors' difference of opinions (Boehme, Danielson, Kumar, and Sorescu, 2009; Doran, Jiang, Peterson, 2009 ), short-term return reversal (Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang, 2010) , the market microstructure effect of measuring idiosyncratic volatility (Han and Lesmond 2010) , investors' preference for idiosyncratic skewness (Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink, 2010) , selective corporate disclosure (Jiang, Yao, and Xu, 2009) , as well as riskbased explanations (Avramov, Cederburg, and Hore, 2009; Chen and Petkova, 2010) . We find that the IVOL anomaly is live and strong among stocks that are highly liquid and have highly active option trading, an intrigue and challenge to the hypotheses based on short-sale constraints, liquidity and short-term return reversal, or other market-microstructure effects.
Further, some aspects of our findings are difficult to reconcile with investors' preference for skewness. On the other hand, the relation among IVOL, option trading, and corporate earnings suggests that an important link between the IVOL anomaly and information about corporate earnings, along the direction proposed by Jiang et al. (2009) .
We discuss several streams of related studies and our relative contributions in Section II. Section III describes the data and methodological issues, including the measurement of idiosyncratic volatility, the identification of stocks with active option trading, and the synthetic stock positions. Empirical results are provided in Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes.
II. Related Literature
Theoretical works show that options help complete the financial market and affect investor welfare (e.g., Ross 1976 ). Moreover, a few studies show that agents with heterogeneous information could better aggregate their information in the presence of options, thus improving the informational efficiency of the market (e.g., Grossman, 1977; Kraus and Smith, 1996; Brennan and Cao, 1996; Cao, 1999) . Black (1975) conjectures that the options market can be an attractive trading venue for informed investors because of the leverage advantage that options offer. Biais and Hillion (1994) and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) formally introduce options into models of informed trading. In particular, Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) explicitly model strategic trading decisions of informed investors in the stock market and the options market. They show that informed investors can effectively hide their information by pooling with uninformed investors in the options market. As a result, option trading volume reveals the trace of private information before such information is incorporated into either option prices or stock prices.
Many studies provide empirical evidence of informed trading in the options market. Easley et al. (1998) find that "signed" option trading volume contains information about subsequent stock returns at a relatively short horizon. Pan and Poteshman (2006) provide strong evidence for the pooling equilibrium of informed and uninformed option traders. Using a unique dataset that allows the identification of buyer-initiated option trades, they construct a put-call ratio that predict stock returns at relatively long horizons. They point out that the put-call ratio is not directly observed by the market, and therefore, the evidence is not necessarily inconsistent with market efficiency in the semi-strong form. In addition, Ni, Pan, and Poteshman (2008) find evidence of option trading based on information about stock return volatilities. In an interesting contrast to Pan and Poteshman (2006) , our finding indicates a certain degree of market inefficiency: the relative option trading measures O/S and OI/S are public information, yet marginal investors fail to infer option traders' information from them when they value options or stocks.
Further, a few studies examine the hypothesis that traders with private information about specific upcoming events may prefer to exploit that information in the options market. For example, Jennings and Starks (1986) , Skinner (1990) , and Mendenhall and Fehrs (1999) find that firms with traded options tend to have quicker price responses to and smaller surprises about corporate events than those that do not. More direct analysis of corporate events shows that options do attract informed traders, for example, see Keown and Pinkerton (1981) , Jayaraman, Frye, and Sabherwal (2001), and Cao, Chen, and Griffin (2005) for M&A announcements; and Amin and Lee (1997), Steven, Ferri, and Angel (2004) , and Cheng and Leung (2008) for earning announcements. Poteshman (2006) finds unusual option market activity on airline stocks around the September 11th attack. Recently, Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010) analyze the cross-section of the ratio of options volume to stock volume. They find that the ratio varies across stocks in a manner that is consistent with informed trading. While our study provides evidence consistent with informed option trading documented by these studies, we focus on a different perspective -the relative magnitude of the selection versus causality effect of informed trading on stock price efficiency.
Our study is further related to the literature about the role of options to overcome short-sale constraints. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) and Figlewski and Webb (1993) argue that in the presence of short-sale constraints, options can improve the speed of price adjustments to negative information. However, recent studies have debated whether options are effective instruments to overcome short-sale constraints. Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw (2004) report that short-sale constraints cause frequent violations of the put-call parity based on daily closing prices. On the other hand, Battalio and Schultz (2006) find that violations of the put-call parity are infrequent for Internet stocks during the NASDAQ bubble period, based on intraday data that better match the time stamps of option and stock quotes. They conclude that it is not difficult to synthetically short Internet stocks; however, investors do not substantially engage in such synthetic shorting because Internet stock mispricing "was not as obvious then as it is now with the benefit of hindsight." Our study puts the role of options to alleviate short-sale constraints under a test in which hindsight is not an issue. This is because informed investors do not have to be aware of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly; when they trade on their private information about firms' future earnings, their trades naturally are in the same direction as a strategy based on the IVOL anomaly suggests.
A sizeable literature exists on the lead-lag relation between stock and option prices, albeit with mixed findings. A few studies find that the options market leads the stock market, e.g., Manaster and Rendelman (1982) , Bhattacharya (1987) , Anthony (1988) , Sheikh and Ronn (1994), and Diltz and Kim (1996) . Others either do not find such evidence or find the opposite, e.g., Vijh (1988) , Stephan and Whaley (1990 ), Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1993 ), and O'Connor (1999 . De Jong and Donders (1998) argue that there are both leads and lags from options to stock markets and vice versa. Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew (2004) find that about 17% of price discovery is due to the options market. Our study, by focusing on stock market mispricing, provides an alternative way to assess the contribution of options to price discovery.
The effect of option listing on stock prices has also attracted considerable attention among researchers, for example, see Conrad (1989) , Sorescu (2001), Mayhew and Mihov (2005) . In addition, Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) find that active option trading is positively related to firm valuation. More related to our study, two papers specifically analyze the effect of option listing on alleviating the stock market mispricing caused by short-sale constraints and investors' differences of opinion. Boehme, Danielsen, and Sorescu (2006) report that the negative relation between analyst forecast dispersion (a proxy for investors' difference of opinions) and stock returns is weaker among stocks with listed options. In addition, Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2009) find that high-IVOL stocks experience substantially low returns after the events of option listing. Our study, on the other hand, shows that the effect of active option trading on the IVOL anomaly is very different than the effect of mere option listing.
Finally, we recognize an emerging literature on extracting predictive information from options. Our study differs from this research because our interest in information from option trading activities, while the existing studies primarily focus on information from option prices.
First, Cao and Han (2009) find negative abnormal returns to delta-hedged option positions, especially for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, consistent with a negative variance premium in the cross-section of option returns. Since by design the delta-hedged option returns are independent of stock returns, their finding represents the effect of idiosyncratic volatility on option returns in addition to the IVOL anomaly in underlying stock returns. Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2009) find that implied volatility smirk, measured as the difference in implied volatilities between out-of-money puts and at-the-money calls, negatively predicts stock returns. They further show that this variable is related to option traders' private information about future corporate earnings. The nature of information contained in their measure is similar to that of idiosyncratic volatility. However, we find that the effect of relative option trading on the IVOL anomaly is not explained by the smirk effect that they document. Goyal and Saretto (2009) show that the difference between realized volatility and implied volatility contains information to predict the returns of volatility-sensitive option portfolios such as straddles and delta-hedged option returns. They point out that the predictive power of their measure stems from volatility mispricing in option valuation, which may be unrelated to underlying stock mispricing. Indeed, we find that their measure does not predict stock returns, and hence, does not explain the effect of relative option trading on the IVOL anomaly.
The fourth is a recent study by Ang, Bali, and Cakici (2010) . They use the changes in implied volatility to capture potential informed option trading effects, and find that changes in call implied volatility positively predict stock returns, while changes in put implied volatility negatively predict stock returns. They further report that past stock returns predict changes in implied volatility, suggesting informed trading in both the options and stock markets.
III. Data and Methodology

III.A. Idiosyncratic Volatility Measure and the Stock Sample
We obtain stock return and price data from CRSP. Idiosyncratic volatility for an individual stock, IVOL, is the standard deviation of the estimated residuals from regressing daily stock returns (R it ) onto contemporaneous and lagged daily market returns (R mt−k ) during a month:
The proxy for market return is the CRSP value-weighted index return. We require a minimum of 15 daily observations in a month for the IVOL estimate to be valid. We have also included daily HML and SMB factors as additional explanatory variables, and the results obtained are quite similar to those based on (1).
The sample period for our analysis is from January 1996 to September 2008, for which we have options data. The stock sample selection follows Ang et al. (2006) . Specifically, our "entire stock sample" in each month consists of all common stocks with valid IVOL estimates and with stock price no less than $5 at the end of the previous month. The exclusion of stocks with price below $5 is to alleviate market microstructure noise in the measurement of returns.
Sample selection is an important issue, as is indicated by the recent debate on the robustness of the IVOL anomaly. Bali and Cakici (2008) report that the IVOL anomaly does not exist when evaluated using equal-weighted portfolios. Huang et al. (2010) report that the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly may be due to short-term return reversal. Specifically, they find that in cross-sectional regressions, idiosyncratic volatility does not have the power to predict future stock return when past stock return is controlled for. Chen et al. (2009) show that the inclusion of penny stocks and non-common stocks makes the IVOL anomaly substantially weak; however, within the sample of non-penny common stocks, the negative relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns is robust using either equal-weighted or value-weighted portfolios, and cannot be explained by monthly return reversal. Our analysis confirms this finding. 1996-2000, 2001-2004, and 2005-2008 . The average IVOL is high during the first subperiod, but declines in the subsequent subperiods. This recent time trend is noted by Brandt, Brav, Graham, and Kumar (2010) and Bekaert, Hodrick, and Zhang (2009) .
III.B. Synthetic Stocks and the Active Option Trading Subsample
We obtained options data from OptionMetrics Ivy DB for the period from January 1996 to We use the synthetic stock approach to evaluate whether options are mispriced with respect to information on idiosyncratic volatility, and whether synthetically shorting stocks can achieve returns similar to directly shorting underlying stocks. The idea is based on the following put-call parity (for European options):
where S is the stock price, C and P are prices of a call and a put with the same strike price and same maturity, PV(D) is the present value of future dividends with ex-dividend dates prior to option expiration, X is the strike price, r is the riskfree rate, and τ is the time to expiration.
A synthetic stock position involves buying a call (C); writing a put (P) with the same underlying stocks, maturity, and strike price; and holding a riskfree asset amounting to
denote the values of this synthetic position at time t and t+1. Then, the return to the synthetic position is R * = S * t+1 /S * t − 1. If Equation (2) holds, the return to this synthetic stock position should be the same as the return to the underlying stock.
For American options, the put-call parity needs to be adjusted for the early exercise premium:
where EEP C and EEP P are early exercise premiums for the call and put respectively. Therefore, the return to the synthetic stocks following (2) only approximately tracks the underlying stock return. One can also create synthetic stock positions following (3) to exactly replicate stock prices. We choose not to do so because the value of the early exercise premium is not model-free, depending on assumptions about the underlying stock price process and estimated parameters such as the implied volatility. The empirical analysis in our paper
shows that relying on (2) to construct synthetic stock positions on average causes only small differences between synthetic stock returns and underlying stock returns for the options we examine.
The rationale for using synthetic stock returns, instead of directly using option returns, to evaluate potential option mispricing is the following. First, despite the complication of the early exercise premium, synthetic stock positions themselves are investable portfolios, with returns readily computed from observed option prices. Second, due to the proximity between synthetic returns and underlying stock returns, we can use asset pricing models well-accepted for underlying stock returns (e.g., the Carhart four-factor model) to detect abnormal returns to synthetic positions. By contrast, returns to straight calls and puts, and to option portfolios in general, are affected by many other factors such as moneyness, maturity, volatility, etc. Measuring their abnormal returns is more challenging and involves additional assumptions. Finally, it is well-known that equity options are subject to additional pricing regularities. For example, a few studies have documented that volatility-sensitive option spread portfolios and delta-hedged option positions exhibit abnormal returns relative to standard asset pricing models; see, e.g., Bakshi and Kapadia (2003) , Coval and Shumway (2001) , Goyal and Saretto (2009) , Doran and Fodor (2008) , and Cao and Han (2009). In particular, some of these studies suggest a negative variance risk premium in option prices relative to underlying stock prices, which, if not properly controlled for, may confound the inference on mispricing specifically related to the IVOL anomaly. The put-call parity ensures that synthetic stock returns are not subject to these confounding effects.
In empirical implementation, to ensure that the synthetic stock positions are investable portfolios and their returns can be measured using observed option quotes, we employ the following procedure to select a subsample of options. We define an option pair as a call and a put on the same underlying stock, with the same strike price and maturity. In each month t, we apply the following filters to select option pairs that are liquid and feasible to buy and hold during the month of t+1. First, we only keep the option pairs that expire in month t+2. This choice is to ensure the feasibility to hold these options during month t+1 and at the same time to maintain a desirable degree of liquidity. 2 Second, we exclude an option pair if either the call or the put has no trading volume or no open interest, has invalid implied volatility, or invalid bid or offer quotes on the last trading day of month t. Invalid quotes are defined as either one side of the quotes being non-positive or the offer being below the bid.
Finally, for liquidity reasons, within the remaining option pairs of an underlying stock, we select the pair with the strike price closest to the money as long as the moneyness is between 0.5 and 1.5.
We use the selected option pairs to construct synthetic stock positions, and hold these positions during the month of t+1. We compute the values of these positions at the beginning and ending of a holding period by using the mid-quote prices of options (i.e., the average of offer and bid quotes). A difficulty in the implementation of this method is that while the option quotes are available for the beginning of the holding period by construction, they may not be available on the last trading day of month t+1. We get around this problem by using the valid quotes (positive offers and bids) from a trading day that is closest to, and within 3 trading days of, the last trading day of month t+1. Such a substitute date can be either in the end of month t+1 or in the beginning of month t+2.
We use the term stocks with active option trading to refer to the subsample of stocks that results from the selection procedure described above; i.e., with tradable option pairs at the end of month t that have measurable synthetic returns during month t+1. It should be noted that the measurability requirement comes at the cost of tradability, because it is not known at the end of month t whether options have measurable returns during month t+1.
To get around this issue, we additionally examine a slightly enlarged sample of stocks that are only required to have tradable option pairs at the end of month t. To ensure measurable option returns, we hold the synthetic positions until option expiration during month t+2, at which time, option values can be simply determined by exercise prices and stock prices. exhibit only a slight downward trend from the first decile (D1) to the eighth decile (D8), but drop off sharply from D8 to the 9th (D9) and 10th (D10) deciles, a pattern well-noted in previous studies such as Ang et al. (2006) and Jiang et al. (2009) . Results based on the four-factor alphas are similar. The D1-D10 difference in four-factor alpha is 1.16%.
IV. Empirical Results
Note that by removing factor exposure, the D1-D10 alpha spread exhibits higher statistical significance (t=4.40) than that for the return spread. The four-factor alpha also exhibits a slight downward drift from D1 to D8, but drops sharply from D8 to D9 and D10.
If the causality effect is strong (i.e., that option trading substantially improves market efficiency), the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly should be weakened among stocks with ac-tively traded options. This prediction is tested using returns across IVOL-sorted portfolios within the "active option trading" subsample. When forming portfolios within the subsample, we use each stock's IVOL decile ranking in the entire stock sample. In this way, the level of idiosyncratic volatility for each portfolio is comparable with that of the corresponding portfolio formed in the whole sample. Table II shows that for this subsample, the number of stocks in each portfolio is around 36 or 37, except for the D1 portfolio, which is 28. Further, stocks in this subsample on average have much higher market caps and lower book-to-market ratios relative to those in the whole sample.
The results do not support the prediction of a strong causality effect. If any, they hint toward the presence of a strong selection effect. The D1 portfolio return for this subsample is the same as that for the whole sample: 0.96%. However, the D10 portfolio return for the subsample is -0.78%, visibly lower than that for the whole sample, -0.27% (the difference is significant, with a t-statistic of -1.80, untabulated). As a consequence, the D1-D10 return difference is higher in this subsample: 1.74%. Similar to the whole sample result, in the subsample the returns are not much different from D1 to D8, but fall sharply for the D9 and D10 portfolios. Controlling for the four factors does not explain away any of these patterns.
In untabulated analysis, we find similar patterns based on value-weighted IVOL decile portfolios.
4
IV.A.2. Synthetic Stock Returns
Given that option trading does not appear to substantially reduce stock mispricing, one may wonder what happens to option pricing. To address this question we look at synthetic stock returns across IVOL-sorted portfolios. The synthetic returns are calculated following steps described in Section III.B.
The results reported in Table III show that the synthetic portfolio returns are very close to the actual stock portfolio returns reported in Table II . For example, the D1 synthetic return is 0.95% and the D10 synthetic return is -0.73%. The bottom-top synthetic return difference is significantly positive at 1.68%. The patterns revealed by the four-factor alphas of synthetic returns are also similar to those for underlying stock returns. Therefore, options appear to be as mispriced as underlying stocks.
Table III also reports the results using synthetic returns adjusted for early exercise premium (EEP). We adjust both the beginning and ending synthetic stock prices by EEP before computing synthetic returns. The early exercise premium is estimated using the Cox-RossRubinstein (CRR) binomial tree method, with details provided in the appendix. It turns out that the impact of the early exercise premium on our findings is small. For example, the EEP-adjusted D1 synthetic return is 0.98%, and the EEP-adjusted D10 synthetic return is -0.72%. These numbers are close to those without EEP adjustment. In addition, the table shows that the EEP adjustment has a very small impact on the four-factor alphas of synthetic portfolio returns.
Several factors may intuitively explain why the EEP adjustment does not substantially change the results. First, the impact of EEP on option price depends on factors such as moneyness, maturity, and volatility. The option pairs used to construct the synthetic stock positions are short-dated and close to the money, resulting in a relatively small magnitude of EEP, which further tends to be symmetric for calls and puts, and therefore offsets each other in (3). Moreover, it is the change of EEP during the portfolio holding month that matters for the EEP-adjusted returns. For many stocks, such changes may be quite small.
Finally, it is interesting to relate our result to the recent debate on the role of options in overcoming short-sale constraints. This debate centers on the put-call parity violation. Battalio and Schultz (2006) point out that the timing mismatch between the daily closing stock prices and the daily closing option quotes in the OptionMetrics data may lead to an overestimation of the frequency of the parity violation. In our study, the focus on synthetic returns gets around this timing mismatch issue because the construction of synthetic positions does not involve spot stock prices. While our analysis does not directly speak to the frequency of the parity violation, the observed proximity between synthetic returns and underlying stock returns suggests that synthetically shorting a stock would earn a return similar to that of directly shorting the underlying stock. Ultimately, this return similarity is what matters for inferring the effectiveness of using options to overcome short-sale constraints.
IV.A.3. Synthetic Positions Held Until Option Expiration
As mentioned earlier, to obtain measurable option returns for the active option trading subsample, we exclude a small number of stocks that have tradable option pairs at the end of month t, but do not have valid option quotes around the end of month t+1. This procedure comes at the cost of tradability for the resulting portfolios. In this part of analysis,
we use an alternative sample selection approach to ensure both tradability and measurable returns. The approach is as follows. First, we identify all the tradable option pairs at the end of each month t, following the procedure described in Section III.2. However, we do not require valid option quotes around the end of month t+1. Instead, we hold the synthetic positions until option expiration, which is during month t+2. The option value at expiration can be simply calculated by using the strike price and the spot price at expiration, without resorting to option quotes. This procedure results in portfolios that are not dependent on ex post information.
The results for this new subsample, reported in Table IV , show that the conclusions we have obtained from Table III are not sensitive to the requirement of valid option quotes at the end of the holding period. The average number of stocks in each IVOL-sorted portfolio is between 41 and 43, except for D1 (at 32). The stock return and synthetic return to the D1 decile are 1.73% and 1.72% respectively. The corresponding numbers for the D10 decile are -0.62% and -0.38%. The bottom-top differences are 2.35% and 2.10%, both significantly positive.
IV.B. Informed Option Trading and the IVOL Anomaly
The evidence based on the "active option trading" subsample is suggestive of a weak causality effect and a strong selection effect. However, this subsample is not explicitly conditioned on Instead, we resort to two relative option trading activity measures that can be constructed using the OptionMetrics data. By using publicly available data to measure informed option trading, our analysis bears directly on the issue of market efficiency. As an additional advantage, the two measures we use are available for virtually all stocks with option listing, enabling us to perform analysis on a very large sample.
Before proceeding to the analysis on proxies for informed option trading, we first provide some descriptive numbers on the subsample of stocks with option listing, especially on the magnitude of the IVOL anomaly in this subsample. In Table V , we report the characteristics and performance of IVOL-sorted portfolios within this subsample (using the IVOL decile ranks formed in the whole sample). For comparison purpose, we also report the results for IVOL-sorted portfolios among stocks without any option listing. As the table shows, the sample size of stocks with option listing is only slightly smaller than that of stocks without option listing. Further, stocks with option listing tend to have higher market caps and lower book-to-market ratios, relative to stocks without option listing. The IVOL anomaly is slightly weaker among stocks with option listing. Among these stocks, the D1-D10 return spread is 1.37%, positive but statistically insignificant, while the D1-D10 spread in the four-factor alpha is 0.94%, significantly positive. Among stocks without option listing, the D1-D10 return spread is 1.21%, significantly positive, although slightly smaller in magnitude. The D1-D10 spread in the four-factor alpha is 1.43%, higher than that for stocks with option listing.
In subsequent analysis, we show that within stocks with option listing, there are quite large variations in the magnitude of the IVOL anomaly, across stocks with different levels of informed option trading. for informed option trading. However, on an ex ante basis, there is no guarantee that high relative option trading activity is always driven by informed trading; it could also be due 5 A few studies have examined the effect of option listing status, or option listing events, on mitigating the stock mispricing caused by the difference of opinions and short-sale constraints. Boehme, Danielson, and Sorescu (2006) report that the negative relation between analyst forecast dispersion (another proxy for investors' difference of opinions) and stock returns is weaker among stocks with listed options. Doran, Jiang, and Peterson (2009) find that high-IVOL stocks experience substantially low returns after option introductions. Different from these studies, the focus of our paper is on the effect of option trading. Arguably, the informational effect is more likely to be present when option trading is active than when options are listed but trading is inactive.
to active hedging trades or a high dispersion of investor opinions in the options market.
Our analysis therefore focuses on a sharper prediction discussed earlier: O/S should be more indicative of informed trading among high-IVOL stocks, and less so among low IVOL stocks.
For a given stock in a month t, O/S is measured by the ratio of the total number of contracts traded during month t on all of its options that expire in month t+2 and beyond, to the stock trading volume during month t. We exclude options expiring in month t and t+1 because they do not allow investors to take full advantage of the private information about stock returns during month t+1. Since stock trading volume for NASDAQ stocks is reported differently than that for NYSE-AMEX stocks, we multiply NASDAQ stock trading volume by a factor of 0.7 (e.g., Anderson and Dyl, 2007) .
To see how informed option trading affects the the IVOL anomaly, we sorted stocks with option listing into three groups based on O/S. Within each group we form equal-weighted decile portfolios using IVOL decile ranks obtained for the whole sample. This independent double-sorting procedure on O/S and IVOL results in 30 stock portfolios. Table VI shows that each portfolio consists of a relatively large number of stocks. Further, the IVOL anomaly is stronger among stocks with higher O/S. For the low O/S tercile, the D1-D10 differences in stock return and four-factor alpha are 0.74% and 0.40%, both statistically insignificant. For the medium O/S tercile, the D1-D10 differences in return and alpha are 1.15% (insignificant) and 0.71% (significant). Finally, for the high O/S tercile, the D1-D10 differences in return and alpha are 1.92% and 1.53%, both statistically significant. The evidence is consistent with a strong selection effect of informed option trading.
Note that the difference in the D1-D10 return spread across the O/S terciles is mainly due to the difference in returns to the high-IVOL stocks. Returns to the D1 stocks across the three O/S groups are similar: 0.95%, 1.00%, and 0.80% respectively. But returns to the D10 stocks change dramatically: 0.21%, -0.15%, and -1.13% from the low to high O/S terciles. This is consistent with that a dominant selection effect and that O/S is a conditional proxy for informed option trading; that is, O/S captures informed trading among high IVOL stocks but does not represent informed trading among low IVOL stocks (which tend to be correctly priced).
The difference in the magnitude of the IVOL anomaly between the high and low O/S terciles are statistically significant. The D10 return difference between the high and low O/S groups is 1.34% (t=2.95). The corresponding difference in alpha is 1.29% (t=3.12). For the D1-D10 return spread, the difference between the high and low O/S groups is 1.20% (t=3.05), and the corresponding difference in alphas is 1.13% (t=2.94). For brevity these numbers are not tabulated.
Mispricing is generally weak among liquid stocks. Therefore one may wonder if the O/S effect reported above is driven by a denominator effect, i.e., stock liquidity. To check this, Table VI reports the average stock trading turnover (STURN) for each portfolio (with NASDAQ trading volume multiplied by 0.7). Within each O/S tercile, stocks with higher IVOL tend to have higher STURN, reflecting the well-known relation between stock trading activity and return volatility. Furthermore, as we move from the low O/S tercile to the high O/S tercile, stock turnover tends to increase slightly, rather than to decrease. We also find that the correlation between O/S and the inverse of stock turnover is 13% (not tabulated), a modest level at best. Therefore, the O/S effect on the IVOL anomaly is not explained by stock liquidity.
Table VI further reports OTURN, the option trading volume (the numerator of O/S) scaled by the total shares outstanding, for each portfolio. For stocks in the same IVOL decile ranking, OTURN tends to increase with O/S. However, in an untabulated analysis, we find that the O/S effect is not solely driven by OTURN. We sort stocks into terciles by OTURN and form IVOL decile portfolios within each OTURN tercile. The D1-D10 IVOL decile return spreads are not monotonic from low to high OTURN terciles: 1.41% (t=1.67), 0.73% (t=0.90), and 1.75% (t=2.06) respectively. Further, their difference between high and low OTURN terciles is much less dramatic. We infer from these results that the interaction between option trading and stock trading is an important driver of the O/S effect on the anomaly. Table VI . If anything different, the results are even stronger. Among the low OI/S group, the D1-D10 IVOL decile return difference is 0.64%. It increases to 2.11% for the high OI/S group. Further, the D1-D10 return difference across OI/S groups is mainly caused by the D10 return difference. For D1 stocks, returns are similar across the three OI/S groups. By contrast, for the D10 stocks, returns drop dramatically from 0.21% for the low OI/S group, to -1.22% for the high OI/S group. Similar patterns exist for the four-factor alphas. The results again indicate that the selection effect dominates, and further, OI/S, similar to O/S, is a conditional proxy for informed option trading.
IV.B.2. OI/S As Proxy for Informed Option Trading
Our second proxy for informed option trading, OI/S, is a variation of O/S. OI/S is
The difference in the magnitude of the IVOL anomaly between the high and low OI/S terciles is statistically significant. The D10 return difference between the high and low OI/S groups is 1.43% (t=3.18). The corresponding difference in alphas is 1.45% (t=2.67).
The difference in the D1-D10 return spread between the high and low OI/S groups is 1.47% (t=3.02), and the corresponding difference in alphas is 1.49% (t=2.57). Again these numbers are not tabulated.
Table VII also reports on OITURN (open interest scaled by shares outstanding) and STURN (stock turnover) for each portfolio. Moving from the low OI/S tercile to the high O/S tercile, OITURN increases, whereas stock turnover remains relatively stable (with a slight inverse-U shape). In addition, OI/S and the inverse of stock turnover have only a modest correlation of 0.14 (ultabulated). Therefore, the OI/S effect is not merely driven by stock liquidity. Further, in an untabulated analysis, we double-sort stocks by IVOL and OITURN. The D1-D10 IVOL decile return spread is 1.02% (t=1.23), 0.97% (t=1.15), and 1.71% (t=2.16) in low, medium, and high OITURN terciles. Again, the return spread does not monotonically increase with OITURN, and the difference in the return spread between the high and low OITURN terciles is much less dramatic. Therefore, the OI/S effect on the IVOL anomaly is not unilaterally driven by open interest; rather, the interaction between option open interest and stock trading plays an interesting role. Pan and Poteshman (2006) show that buyer-initiated trades on calls and puts contain different information about future stock returns. Investors with favorable information about a stock are likely to buy calls, while investors with unfavorable information on a stock are likely to buy puts. Consequently, private information about low-IVOL stocks may mainly be reflected in call trading activities, while private information on high-IVOL stocks may mainly be revealed by put trading activities.
IV.B.3. O/S and OI/S Separately Measured for Calls and Puts
Easley et al. (1998) and
Following this intuition, we construct O/S separately for calls and puts. For stocks in the bottom five IVOL deciles, we further independently sort them into terciles by call-O/S.
For stocks in the top five IVOL deciles, we independently sort them into terciles by put-O/S.
This procedure results in 30 stock portfolios. For brevity, the results are not tabulated but are instead summarized below. For the D1 stocks, the returns exhibit a small decline from 1.04%, 0.91%, to 0.82% as we move from low call-O/S to high call-O/S terciles. By contrast, for the D10 stocks, a more discernible decline in returns occurs: 0.25%, -0.52%, and -0.87% as we move from low put-O/S to high put-O/S terciles. This result suggests that the relative put option trading activity captures option traders' negative information about high-IVOL stocks.
We also construct OI/S separately for calls and puts, and perform similar analysis. For the D1 deciles, returns exhibit relatively small differences across the three call-OI/S groups.
On the other hand, for the D10 stocks, returns to the low, medium, and high put-OI/S terciles are quite different, at 0.19%, -0.40%, and -1.38% respectively.
A caveat to this approach is that we assume that call and put option trading activities primarily reveal the information of option purchasers. However, Lakonishok, Lee, Pearson, and Poteshman (2007) show that a substantial part of non-market-makers' option open interests is due to option writing. The separate construction of OS and OI/S for calls and puts would validly capture the direction of option traders' information under the additional assumption that investors with information about stock returns mainly engage in option purchasing, while option writing is not as intensely driven by information. Apparently, these measures could be improved with the access to separate data on option purchasing and option writing.
IV.B.4. Multivariate Regressions
We use the following cross-sectional regressions to control for various factors that may confound our inference on the O/S effect:
where R it+1 is stock return during month t+1, SIZE it is market capitalization at the end of month t, BM it is the book-to-market ratio based on market capitalization at the end of month t and book value for the fiscal year reported by the end of month t, PrRet it is stock return during the period from month t-12 to month t-1, and R it is stock return during month t. IVOL it is the idiosyncratic volatility measured for month t, and O/S it is the relative option trading activity measure. TURN it is the exchange-adjusted stock trading turnover during month t. Our main object of interest is the product term Ln(O/S it ) * IVOL it , which captures the effect of O/S on the IVOL anomaly. We include the term Ln(TURN it )*IVOL it as a control to address the concern that the O/S effect may be driven merely by stock trading activity. The regression is performed across individual stocks each month, following the Fama-MacBeth procedure.
We use SMIRK it and RV it -IV it to control for two known option pricing effects. Xing, Zhang, and Zhao (2009) report that option-implied volatility smirks reveal option traders' information about future stock returns. At the end of each month t, we measure SMIRK it (referred to as SKEW in Xing, et al. (2009) ) by the difference between the implied volatility of an out-of-money put (with moneyness between 0.8 and 0.95, and closest to 0.95) and the implied volatility of an at-the-money call (with moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05, and closest to 1), with the call and the put expiring in month t+2. In addition, Goyal and Saretto (2009) find that the difference between past realized volatility and current implied volatility contains predictive information about returns to volatility-sensitive option portfolios (e.g., straddles
and delta-hedged option positions). Following their study, RV it -IV it is the difference between the historical realized volatility estimated using daily returns during the past 12 months, and the option implied volatility at the end of a month t. The implied volatility is averaged over estimates from all at-the-money (moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05) calls and puts that expire in month t+2.
The regression results are reported in Table VIII . As it turns out, the coefficient for the terms capturing the effect of relative option trading activity, Ln(O/S it )*IVOL it , id significantly negative, whether or not controlling for Ln(TURN it )*IVOL it . They remain significantly negative after controlling for SMIRK and RV-IV. 6 When we perform regressions using OI/S it in place of O/S it , the results are similar. We consider two measures of future corporate earnings news. The first is standard unexpected earnings (SUE) for the fiscal quarter reported within three months after portfolio formation. Specifically,
where ∆EPS is the change of earnings per share (EPS) from four quarters ago, u(∆EPS) and σ(∆EPS) are respectively the mean and standard deviation of ∆EPS during the past 8 quarters. We require a minimum of 4 quarterly observations of ∆EPS for the computed SUE to be valid.
The second measure is the earnings announcement return (EAR), defined as the stock return during the five trading days starting from two days prior to the earnings announcement that is made during the three months from month t+1 to month t+3. The use of the earnings announcement return also helps to differentiate the IVOL-return relation from a risk-premium based explanation, since large returns during the short earnings announcement windows tend to be driven by information surprises and are unlikely attributable to risk premium. SUEs between the D1 and D10 IVOL deciles increases as we move from the low O/S (or OI/S) tercile to the high O/S (OI/S) tercile. Therefore, the negative relation between IVOL and future earnings is intensified when relative option trading activity is high. This is telling evidence that the O/S effect is closely related to private information about future earnings, rather than being driven by uninformed beliefs.
The result on EARs reveals a similar pattern. Returns around earnings announcements are high for D1 stocks and low for D10 stocks. When moving from the low to high O/S (OI/S) terciles, the announcement returns to the D10 stocks become more negative, and the differences in EARs between the D1 and D10 stocks become larger.
It is interesting to note is that among the stocks in the lowest IVOL decile, stocks with higher O/S (OI/S) have substantially higher SUEs but not substantially higher EARs.
A possible explanation to the different patterns for SUE and EAR here is that SUE is based on a coarse measure of investors' earnings expectations (i.e., based on a seasonallyadjusted random-walk model of quarterly earnings), while EARs measure the true magnitude of investors' surprises at earnings announcements. The good news (high SUEs) of low-IVOL firms may already be public information at the time of earnings announcement, causing little surprises among investors.
IV.D. Alternative Interpretations of the O/S and OI/S Effects
We sharpen the inference by analyzing two more alternative interpretations of the O/S effect.
The first alternative is that high relative option trading activity represents the attraction of options to investors with a strong gambling incentive, i.e., a strong preference for positive idiosyncratic skewness in returns. If options attract gamblers, following Boyer et al. (2010) , among high IVOL stocks, those with higher idiosyncratic skewness may have higher option trading activity and lower required returns. To test this hypothesis we use idiosyncratic stock return skewness to quantify the preference of investors with gambling incentives on a given stock. Idiosyncratic return skewness (ISKEW) is the skewness of the log of residual returns from the regression specified in Equation (1), measured during the two months after portfolio formation.
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The second alternative interpretation suggests that when investors face short-sale constraints in the stock market, they may switch to the options market to express their negative views about stocks. This switch could result in high relative option trading for short-sale constrained stocks. 8 Furthermore, if such option trading fails to generate a significant impact 7 We obtain similar results when using an expected idiosyncratic skewness measure based on ex ante firm characteristics.
8 However, the evidence from two recent studies appears to be inconsistent with this hypothesis. Grundy, Lim, and Verwijmeren (2010) and Battalio and Schultz (2010) report depressed option trading activity for stocks subject to the 2008 short-sale ban. Grundy et al. point out that tight short-sale constraint makes it difficult for option market makers or other option writers to hedge their positions in the stock market, thus making them reluctant to provide liquidity to the options market.
on underlying stock prices, the Miller's (1977) (6) where SIZE is the market cap, IO is institutional ownership as a percentage of shares outstanding, SIG is the standard deviation of tailing six-month daily stock returns, IPO is an indicator for initial public offerings conducted during past 12 months, TURN is the monthly stock trading volume scaled by total shares outstanding, CF is annual cash flow scaled by total assets, and GLAMOR is an indicator for the stock being in the bottom 3 deciles of book-to-market ratio. We follow the procedure of D'Avilio (2002) for constructing these variables. A higher SSC indicates a higher likelihood of binding short-sale constraints. Table X 9 See Table 6 in D'Avolio (2002). D'Avolio includes several additional stock characteristics in the regression, such as analyst forecast dispersion, an internet stock indicator, and a past loser indicator. However, the coefficients of these additional variables are either insignificant or significant but with alternating signs over time. We do not include them in the proxy.
Therefore, high-IVOL stocks are difficult to short. Further, SSC increases as we move from the low O/S tercile to the high O/S tercile. However, the pattern does not hold across OI/S terciles -for stocks in the top IVOL decile, SSC is lower within the high OI/S tercile relative to the other two OI/S terciles. This result casts doubt on the hypothesis that the short-sale constraints explain the OI/S effect.
To further examine these two alternatives, we perform analysis based on the following Fama-MacBeth regressions:
where the explanatory variables SIZE it , BM it , PrRet it , R it , IVOL it , O/S it are the same as those in regression (4). ISKEW it and SSC it are previously defined. For brevity, we highlight the key results in the following, without reporting them in a table.
The coefficient for Ln(O/S it ) * IVOL it , which represents the O/S effect, is -0.30 (t=-3.63).
The coefficient for ISKEW it * IVOL it is 0.59 (t=5.62), and that for SSC it * IVOL it is -0.03 (t=-0.73). Therefore, the O/S effect on the anomaly remains significant after controlling for the effects of idiosyncratic skewness and short-sale constraints. Meanwhile, the predicted effects of idiosyncratic skewness and short-sale constraints are not supported by the data -their corresponding coefficients should be significantly negative if the two alternative hypotheses hold.
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We further perform regressions similar to (7) but replace O/S with OI/S. The conclusion is the same. To highlight, the coefficient for Ln(OI/S it ) * IVOL it is significantly negative, at -0.34 (t=-3.49). Meanwhile, the coefficient for ISKEW it * IVOL it is 0.61 (t=5.70), and the coefficient for SSC it * IVOL it is -0.04 (t=-1.29). The results do not provide support for the alternative hypotheses.
V. Conclusions
This study investigates the informational role of options in the context of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly. We make two main contributions. First, we document that active option trading (relative to stock trading) exacerbates the magnitude of mispricing in stocks and options, evidence rather surprising in light of the theoretical prediction that informed option trading improves stock price efficiency. Our analysis suggests that the observed relation between informed option trading and stock/option mispricing is dominated by a selection effect; that is, informed trading most likely occurs on most mispriced securities. Our empirical findings also epitomize an insight developed by Easley et al. (1998) : in a non-competitive option market, option trading volume leads option and stock prices in revealing traders' private information.
Second, our study contributes to the active debate in the current literature on the cause of the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly. Stocks with active option trading are liquid and are unlikely to be short-sale constrained, yet the idiosyncratic volatility anomaly is strong among such stocks. Such evidence presents a challenge to the popular hypotheses that this anomaly is due to the effect of short-sale constraints or liquidity.
Appendix: Early Exercise Premium Estimation
We use the binomial tree method of Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein (1979) to estimate the early exercise premium (EEP) for American options. We provide the details in this appendix. We calculate EEP as the difference between the market price of the American option and the imputed value of the European option with the same parameters, including maturity, strike price, and implied volatility. To use the CRR method to compute the European option value, we need the following inputs: 1) Dividend yield, 2) Riskfree rate, 3) Stock price, 4) Strike price, 5) Implied volatility, and 6) Days to maturity (DTM).
We divide the time period from the current date to option expiration into 50 subperiods. Thus, if DTM is 40 days, each subperiod is 40/50 of a day. For inputs, we obtain monthly riskfree rates from Fama-French factors database in Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). We estimate annual dividend yield by the per-share dividends (split-adjusted) during a year scaled by the beginning-of-year stock price available from CRSP. Stock price, strike price, and days to maturity are straightforward to obtain. However, implied volatility is not directly observable and needs to be estimated.
We estimate the implied volatility using the CRR method by fitting the CRR imputed American option value to the market price of the option. This process involves an iterated optimization procedure, and the starting value for the implied volatility in this procedure is the implied volatility estimate provided by OptionMetrics. However, about 20% of implied volatility estimates in OptionMetrics are missing, especially for out-of-money options. In such cases, we use a non-linear regression to find an appropriate starting value for implied volatility, following Dumas, Fleming, and Whaley (1998) :
where IV is the implied volatility, S/X is the moneyness, (T-t)/365 is the days to maturity, and is an error term. We obtain the coefficient estimates a 0,t to a 5,t by regressing the non-missing implied volatility observations from OptionMetrics on the independent variables in (8). Then, using estimated coefficients, we produce fitted values for options that have missing implied volatilities but have valid observations for the independent variables, following Equation (8). We can then use the fitted implied volatilities as the starting value for the iterated optimization procedure.
After estimating the implied volatility, we calculate the European option value in a straightforward application of the CRR method, and then obtain the CRR-based early exercise premium estimates (observed American option price minus imputed European option value). Finally, the EEP-adjusted synthetic stock price is:
We further calculate the EEP-adjusted synthetic return as: 1996-2000, 2001-2004, and 2005-2008 . The entire stock sample consists of all common stocks with a price no less than $5 at the end of the portfolio formation month. N is the average number of stocks in each month during the period or subperiod. IVOL is the standard deviation of the estimated residuals from regressing daily stock returns onto contemporaneous daily market returns as well as three lagged market returns. We calculate both the mean and median of IVOL across all stocks in a month and then average the statistics over the entire period and over the subperiods. This table reports the average IVOL, monthly returns, and the monthly Carhart (1997) four-factor alphas to equal-weighted decile stock portfolios sorted on IVOL for the entire sample of common stocks and for the active option trading subsample. The entire stock sample consists of all common stocks with a price no less than $5 at the end of the portfolio formation month. The active option trading subsample consists of common stocks from the entire stock sample that meet the following selection criteria: there is at least a pair of call and put options on the stock expiring two months after the portfolio formation month; having the same strike price; and having positive trading volume and positive open interest; having valid quotes on the last trading day of the formation month, and having valid quotes during the 5 trading days around the last trading day of month t+1. IVOL is the standard deviation of the estimated residuals from regressing daily stock returns onto contemporaneous daily market returns as well as three lagged market returns. When forming IVOL decile portfolios within the active option trading subsample, we use the IVOL breakpoints obtained for the entire stock sample. D1 (D10) is the portfolio of stocks with the lowest (highest) IVOL. D1-D10 is the difference between portfolio D1 and portfolio D10. N is the average number of stocks each month for each decile. SIZE is the average market cap (in $ billions), and BM is the average book-to-market ratio. This table reports the average synthetic returns with and without the EEP adjustment, and the corresponding four-factor alphas for decile portfolios sorted on IVOL, within the option trading subsample. The option trading subsample consists of common stocks from the entire stock sample that meet the following selection criteria: there is at least a pair of call and put options on the stock expiring two months after the portfolio formation month; having the same strike price; having positive trading volume and positive open interest; and having valid quotes on the last trading day of the formation month. Synthetic stock return without EEP adjustment is the return to a synthetic stock position that involves buying a call, selling a put with the same maturity and strike price, and holding risk-free assets amounting to the present value of strike price and expected dividends. The EEP-adjusted synthetic stock return is the synthetic stock return adjusting for the early exercise premium, following the CRR procedure described in the Appendix. The IVOL decile ranking for a stock is based on the IVOL decile breakpoints of the entire stock sample. D1 (D10) is the portfolio of actual stocks with the lowest (highest) idiosyncratic volatility. D1-D10 is the difference between D1 and D10 portfolios. N is the average number of stocks for each decile in each month. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. All returns and alphas are in percentage points. The portfolio formation period is from January 1996 through September 2008. This table reports average stock returns and synthetic returns (without EEP adjustment) for decile stock portfolios sorted on IVOL, within the option trading subsample. The option trading subsample consists of common stocks from the entire stock sample that meet the following selection criteria: there is at least a pair of call and put options on the stock expiring two months after the portfolio formation month; having the same strike price; having positive trading volume and positive open interest; and having valid quotes on the last trading day of the formation month. The stock returns and the synthetic stocks without EEP adjustment are calculated for the holding period from the end of the portfolio formation month until the date of option expiration, i.e., the third Friday of the second month after portfolio formation. Synthetic stock return is the return to a synthetic stock position that involves buying a call, selling a put with the same maturity and strike price, and holding risk-free assets amounting to the present value of strike price and expected dividends. The IVOL decile ranking for a stock is based on the IVOL decile breakpoints of the entire stock sample. D1 (D10) is the portfolio of stocks with the lowest (highest) idiosyncratic volatility. D1-D10 is the difference between the D1 and D10 portfolios. IVOL is the standard deviation of the estimated residuals from regressing daily stock returns onto contemporaneous daily market returns as well as three lagged market returns. N is the average number of stocks for each decile. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. All returns and synthetic returns are in percentage points. The portfolio formation period is from January 1996 through September 2008. This table reports average stock returns and Carhart four-factor alphas for equal-weighted IVOL decile portfolios in two subsamples of stocks. The first subsample consists of all stocks within the entire stock sample that have option listings in the portfolio formation month. The second subsample consists of all stocks within the entire stock sample that do not have any option listings in the portfolio formation month. IVOL is the standard deviation of the estimated residuals from regressing daily stock returns onto contemporaneous daily market returns as well as three lagged market returns. The IVOL decile ranking for a stock is based on the IVOL decile breakpoints of the entire stock sample. D1 (D10) is the portfolio of actual stocks with the lowest (highest) IVOL. D1-D10 is the difference in monthly returns between D1 and D10. N is the average number of stocks in each decile. SIZE is the average market cap (in $ billions), and BM is the average book-to-market ratio. This table reports the result from the following Fama-MacBeth regressions. The dependent variable is stock return during month t+1. The explanatory variables include log market capitalization Ln(SIZE), log bookto-market ratio Ln(BM), past stock returns from month t-12 to month t-1 PrRet, stock return during month t R t , log stock trading turnover ln(TRUN), idiosyncratic volatility IVOL, log ratio of option trading volume to stock trading volume Ln(O/S), log ratio of option open interest to stock trading volume Ln(OI/S), the difference in implied volatilities between the an out-of-money put and an at-the-money call (SMIRK), and the difference between realized daily stock return standard deviation during the past 12 months and the implied volatility from at-the-money options (RV-IV). We multiply all coefficients except for IVOL and product terms involving IVOL by 100. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using the Newey-West procedure with three lags. Adj. R 2 is the average adjusted R-squares of the monthly regressions. The sample period is from January 1996 to September 2008.
IVOL
(1) This table reports standardized unexpected earnings (SUE) and returns around earnings announcements (EAR) for stock portfolios doublesorted on idiosyncratic volatility and one of the two relative option trading activity measures: O/S and OI/S. In each month t, we double-sort stocks by IVOL and by O/S (or OI/S) into 10×3 portfolios. SUE is standardized unexpected earnings for the fiscal quarter reported within the three months after portfolio formation. EAR is the 5-day return starting from two trading days prior to quarterly earnings announcements made during month t+1 to month t+3. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are computed using the Newey- (-46.15) 
